Implementing R&D policies : an analsysis of Spain´s pharmaceutical research program. by Desmet, Klaus et al.
Research Policy 33 (2004) 1493–1507
Implementing R&D policies: an analysis of Spain’s
pharmaceutical research program
Klaus Desmeta,b,∗, Praveen Kujala,F´ elix Loboa
a Department of Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Getafe (Madrid)28903, Spain
b CEPR, UK
Abstract
We analyze Spain’s National Pharmaceutical Research Program using detailed firm-l vel data. We fin differences between
ex ante announced evaluation criteria and ex post implementation. This suggests that judging R&D programs on their design,
rather than their implementation, may be misleading. We also uncover that the apparent discrimination against non-European
firm can be interpreted as a premium to having local production facilities. Overall, the program values firm on the basis of
criteria, such as R&D investment and patent spending, consistent with empirically tested measures of innovative activity.
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1. Introduction
Given its importance, the design of public support
programs for innovation has received much attention
(Martin and Scott, 2000; Trajtenberg, 2002). To eval-
uate the effectiveness of such programs, the literature
has relied on both case studies and firm-l vel microe-
conometric evidence (Klette et al., 2000; Hall and Van
Reenen, 2000). However, between a program’s design
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anditsoutcomethereisanimportantintermediatestep:
its implementation. A well-designed program may fail
if poorly implemented.
To judge the success of a program, one should take
into account possible differences between its ex ante
design and its ex post implementation. For instance, a
program’sdesignmayclaimitrewardsfirm ontheba-
sisofbothresearchandcommercialsuccess.However,
only its implementation can tell us how and whether
the design was put into practice. Focusing on Spain’s
National Pharmaceutical Research Program, we use a
unique firm-l vel data set to explore these issues. Our
aimisthreefold:first wehighlightthegapbetweende-
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sign and implementation; second, we analyze whether
the implementation is broadly in line with the pro-
gram’s objectives of R&D promotion; and, third, we
try to uncover any other criteria that might have been
used, such as possible discrimination in favor of Span-
ish firms
We look at Profarma, a Spanish government sup-
portprogramforpharmaceuticalresearchthatranfrom
1998 to 2000. All firm applying to take part in Pro-
farma were ranked by a committee of the Ministry of
Science and Technology. This ranking translated into
financia supportandothernon-monetarybenefits such
as faster approval or beneficia pricing of new drugs.
The officia call for applications explicitly stated the
rankingcriteria.Usingtheapplicationformsasourpri-
mary data source, we were able to extract manually all
relevant quantifiabl criteria on a fir by fir basis.
This information then allowed us to determine which




ex post applied criteria. A number of variables specifi
cally stated in the call for applications, such as having
an R&D center or collaborating with other firm or
institutions, turn out to be statistically unimportant un-
der a variety of different specifications It is difficul to
identify the reasons behind this divergence. Such dif-
ferences may be due to discrepancies between the gov-
ernment’s true objectives and it’s announced policy, or
they may reflec a gap between the policy define by
thehigherlevelsofgovernmentanditsimplementation
by lower executive levels.
Our second result is that, in spite of the differences
between the ex ante and ex post criteria, the program’s
implementation is broadly consistent with its objec-
tives. The criteria, which end up determining the rank-
ingoffirms suchasR&Dinvestmentandpatentspend-
ing, are in line with results from the empirical litera-
ture on innovative activity. As argued by Griliches et
al.(1991),innovativesuccessinthepharmaceuticalin-
dustry is best measured by R&D investment and patent
counts. In that sense, Profarma did what it was set out
to do: reward firm on the basis of their capacity to
innovate.
Our third result is the uncovering of a hidden pre-
mium for Spanish and European Union firms More
specificall , on a scale from 1 to 6, the probability of
getting a grade of 4 or above increases by 0.61 for
Spanish companies, and by 0.45 for European Union
firms However, after dropping the firm without pro-
duction plants in Spain from the sample, this preferen-
tial treatment disappears. This suggests that producing
locally is strongly rewarded. This can be interpreted in
two ways. On the one hand, Profarma may be an in-
direct way of subsidizing production and employment,
rather than R&D. On the other hand, if the produc-
tivity of R&D depends on local manufacturing, as ar-
guedbyPisano(1997),thenrewardinglocalproduction
amounts to stimulating R&D.
Therestofthepaperisorganizedasfollows.Section
2placesourcontributioninthewiderliteratureonpub-
lic R&D programs. Section 3 gives some background
on the Spanish government support plan to the phar-
maceutical industry. Section 4 analyzes the Profarma
program. Section 5 gives the conclusion.
2. Related literature
Public support programs for R&D can be divided
into three stages: design, implementation, and fina re-
sults. The literature has mainly focused on the design
and the results, without paying much attention to the
implementation. However, uncovering the differences
between design and implementation is important, be-
cause the assessment and the eventual success of a re-
searchprogramhasmoretodowithitsimplementation
than with its design.
This is not to say that the existing literature has
failed to take into account the implementation stage
when evaluating the results of a research program. It is
wellknownthatpublicsupportisnotallocatedinaran-
dom fashion, so that controlling for how a program is
implemented is standard practice in the empirical liter-
ature (Klette et al., 2000). To give an example, assume
that R&D subsidies are biased towards large firms and
that fir size is positively correlated with private R&D
spending. In that case, if one fails to control for fir
size, the estimated effect of R&D subsidies on private
R&D spending will be upward biased. The literature
deals with this non-random selection in two ways. A
firs approach is to control for a number of observable
differences across firms such as sales or employment.
This does not suffic if unobservable variables enter
into the selection process. In that case, a second ap-
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proach consists in controlling for fir and time fi ed
effects (see, e.g., Lach, 2002). Nevertheless, dealing
with selection bias remains an arduous task, making it
difficul toevaluatetheeffectivenessofpublicresearch
programs. As a solution, some experts have suggested
incorporatingtheneedforevaluationinthedesignpro-
cess of these programs (Jaffe, 2002).
Although the literature on evaluating public R&D
programs takes into account how firm get selected, it
typically falls short in explicitly uncovering how the
implementation process works.1 As a result, it is un-
able to highlight the differences between design and
implementation. The inability of addressing this issue
derives from two problems. One, in most cases there is
nogoodtheoreticalmodelofhowapublicsupportpro-
gram is implemented. The lack of a structural model of
government agency behavior makes evaluating public
programs difficul (David et al., 2000). Two, even if
there were a good theoretical model, there might not
be a way of testing it for want of data. Controlling for
certain observable fir characteristics might provide a
partial answer. However, as soon as unobservables en-
ter into play, there is no way of contrasting design and
implementation.
We believe we have answers to both problems. The
officia call for applications, in which the evaluation
criteria are described in detail, is taken as our exoge-
nously given theoretical model of the program’s de-
sign. Regarding data, we consider the primary source,
i.e., the application forms. It is therefore reasonable to
assume that we have access to the same data as the
MinistryofScienceandTechnology.Byregressingthe
ranking of firm on the officia evaluation criteria we
can test which criteria played a role and which did not.
Of course one could argue that other criteria, not stated
in the officia call, were also used to rank firms How-
ever,assumingthatwehavethesameinformationasthe
Ministry, these other unofficia criteria would show up
in the application forms. In principle, we should there-
forebeabletocontrolforthem.Thisiswhatwedo,for
instance, when we take into account the geographical
origin of firms
Using the application forms as the primary data
source is similar to the approach of Arora et al. (1998),
who analyze the effects of public funding on research
1 Arora et al. (1998) is an exception to this. We will discuss their
work in more detail later in the paper.
output in the Italian biotechnology sector. As in our




in measuring the productivity of public support.
Understanding the implementation process is key
when evaluating public R&D programs. The existing
literature on this subject typically starts by describing
the program’s design, and then tests whether public
supporttoR&DencouragesprivateinvestmentinR&D
(Klette et al., 2000; David et al., 2000; Trajtenberg,
2002; Lach, 2002). These papers give the impression
that they are evaluating the program’s design. How-
ever, what they are in fact testing is the program’s im-
plementation. It is unclear how to interpret their results
if design and implementation differ and if information
onimplementationislacking.Forinstance,ifonefind
thatR&DsubsidiessubstituteprivateR&Dinvestment,
this could be either because the program was badly de-
signed or because it was badly implemented. The lit-
erature is of course aware of this problem, and it does
mention, in passing, that results may be hard to inter-
pret in the absence of an adequate model of implemen-
tation. For instance, Lach (2002) suggests that the ef-
fect of R&D subsidies may be upward biased, because
governmentbureaucratstendtobeunderpressuretose-
lect projects that are sure to succeed. However, there is
no way of backing up this suspicion. Some authors go
some way in uncovering implementation biases. For
example, Lerner (1999) shows that there is evidence
thatthegovernmentsupportsfirm inbackwardregions
in the case of the Small Business Research Innovation
(SBIR) program. Overall, the literature has found no
good way of explicitly studying how public R&D pro-
grams are implemented. This is the contribution of our
paper. Not only are we able to contrast the design and
its implementation, we also show that concerns about
differences between the ex ante announced criteria and
the ex post applied criteria are real.
3. Spain’s National Pharmaceutical Research
Program
3.1. Brief background
Compared to most developed economies, Spain has
been a laggard in total factor productivity growth. In
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the 1990’s, TFP in Spain grew at an annual rate of
0.1%, compared to 0.5% in the Eurozone, and 1.7% in
theUnitedStates(Sebasti´ an,2001).Itisbynowwidely
believedthatthelackofR&Disoneofthekeyproblems
of the Spanish economy. Only 1% of GDP is spent on
research and development, putting Spain 24th out of
the 30 member countries of the OECD (2004). The
number of researchers as a fraction of the labor force,
although growing, is still significantl lower than in
most developed nations. This absence of innovation is
especiallytrueintheprivatesector(BuesaandMolero,
1998; Martin, 1999; OECD, 2004; Myro, 2004).
Starting with the so-called “Science Law” of 1986,
the Spanish government has attempted to correct this
problem.2 The public promotion of R&D has been in
the hands of the Center for Industrial Technology De-
velopment, which finance particular projects, and the
Ministry of Science and Technology, which develops
different sectoral initiatives. It turns out that one of the
earliest initiatives was the R&D support program for
the pharmaceutical industry. This is hardly surprising,
as it is one of the most technologically innovative sec-
tors (Scherer, 2000).
An additional concern in the European context is
the eroding competitive position of its pharmaceuti-
cal industry. A couple of decades ago innovation de-
pended mainly on organic chemistry, Europe’s tradi-
tional power base. In recent years, however, the phar-
maceutical industry has been increasingly shifting to-
wards biotechnology. This knowledge shift has also
meant a geographical shift. With the possible excep-
tion of British firms the competitive edge of Euro-
pean companies has been disappearing, with the U.S.
pharmaceuticalindustrybecomingtheclearleader(see
Gambardella et al., 2000; Jacobzone, 2000). This has
prompted European national governments and the Eu-
ropean Union to design plans to counter this trend.3
The pharmaceutical industry in Spain has been a
latecomer in R&D. At the end of the seventies it was
made up of multinationals and a large number of small
family-owned laboratories. These small companies,
which accounted for a substantial share of the mar-
2 Ley 13/86 de promoci´ on y coordinaci´ on general de la investi-
gaci´ on cient´ ıfic y tecnol´ ogica.
3 See European Commission 93/718 (2 May 1994) for more de-
tails on the policy implications of the eroding competitive position
of the European pharmaceutical industry.
ket, focused on the production of pharmaceutical spe-
cialities. They either imported active substances from
countries with no patents, or they had license agree-
ments with multinationals. The lack of patent protec-
tion opened the door for dynamic Spanish companies
tocopynewdrugs,sometimesleadingtodevelopments
in formulation and dosage.
The 1980s witnessed major restructuring, as multi-
nationals took over many of the smaller Spanish firms
which were unable to survive the breakup of the lo-
callyprotectedmarket.Spain’sentryintotheEuropean
Union exposed the national industry to greater compe-
tition. The common market meant the removal of both
tariff and non-tariff barriers through, for instance, the
harmonization of market regulations. In addition, the
1985 Adhesion Treaty obliged Spain to implement full
patent protection, until then largely absent. This mo-
tivated the firs major initiative to support R&D and
innovation in the pharmaceutical industry.
When the National Pharmaceutical Research Pro-
gram took off in 1986, the local industry lacked the
capacity to innovate, R&D was virtually non-existent,
andSpainwasabsentfrominternationalmarkets.Gov-
ernment support to R&D in the pharmaceutical indus-
try has since then gone through four successive plans:
Farma I (1986–1990), Farma II (1991–1993), Farma
III (1994–1997) and Profarma (1998–2000).
3.2. The Profarma plan: 1998–2000
This paper focuses on Profarma, the most recent
public program supporting R&D in the pharmaceuti-
cal industry. It ran from 1998 to 2000, with the aim
of “establishing a procedure to support research and
the introduction of new production technologies for
pharmaceuticals and raw materials”. In the officia call
for applications this objective was translated into four
quantifiabl goals: first R&D expenses as a propor-
tion of sales of ethical drugs should reach 8%; second,
R&D expenses and investments should rise to 312 mil-
lion D ; third, there should be at least 3000 employees
in research activities; and fourth, that the worsening
trade balance should be improved.
Participating firm were evaluated and ordered into
different categories. This ranking had different ramifi
cations.Ontheonehand,ittranslatedintofinancia aid
for specifi research projects. This financia aid came
in the form of direct subsidies or zero interest loans.
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On the other hand, receiving a good ranking enhanced
a firm s reputation, which was useful for purposes of
price setting and speedy approval of new products.
Arguably, firm were mostly interested in this non-
monetary aspect, as the magnitude of subsidies was
limited: it represented a mere 2.20% of R&D invest-
ment by participating firm in 1998; this already low
figur droppedfurthertoadismal0.65%by2000.4 The
importance of non-monetary benefit is also reflecte
by the fact that certain firm applied to participate in
Profarma without asking for research funding.
Apart from rewarding and encouraging R&D, the
public administration also desired to include as many
firm aspossible,becausetheprogramprovideditwith
detailed information about the state of the pharmaceu-
tical industry. In that sense Profarma can be called a
success: in its last year the program included 56 firms
which made up 85% of the market in terms of sales.5
4. Empirical analysis ofProf arma (1998–2000)
Our empirical analysis has three objectives. First,
using data on all companies that participated in Pro-
farma, we contrast the ex ante announced criteria with
theirexpostimplementationbytheSpanishMinistryof
Science and Technology. Second, we analyze whether
the criteria that matter in the implementation of Pro-
farma correspond to those criteria that the empirical
literature has found to have the most important effect
on innovation. Third, we want to uncover any hidden
criteria that might have been used. In particular, we
consider whether any discrimination was made based
on the geographical origin of firms
4.1. Data and evaluation procedure
As shown in Fig. 1, the procedure to rank firm is
based on both scientifi and economic criteria. The
scientifi evaluation is responsibility of the Scientiﬁc
4 It should be mentioned, however, that in the year 2000 the Min-
istryofScienceandTechnologystartedprovidingzerointerestloans,
in addition to direct financia support. Unfortunately, we do not have
data on their magnitude.
5 Total sales of participating firm amounted to 7716 millionD ,
whereas total sales of the sector were 9049 millionD (according to
data of the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica).
Assessment Committee. The committee’s members are
government official from the Ministry of Science and
Technology and the Ministry of Health. With the help
of outside consultants they assign a scientifi grade to
each company after evaluating their scientifi capacity.
Economic evaluation is the responsibility of the Min-
istryofScienceandTechnology.Itisbasedonanumber
of quantifiabl criteria that firm provide on their ap-
plication forms. The ﬁnal grade is a combination of
the scientiﬁc grade and the economic evaluation.H o w
the scientifi and the economic criteria were translated
into the fina grade, and whether other more subjective
aspects entered into play, is not clearly spelled out.
Thecallforapplicationsspecifie theevaluationcri-
teria. These are the ones we use in our empirical analy-
sis. The data were collected manually, using the appli-
cationformsofallfirm asourprimarydatasource.The
Ministry of Science and Technology also provided us
with the scientifi grades. Our data set therefore covers
the entire population of participating firms In 1998,
the Ministry of Science and Technology received 51
applications; in 1999 that number remained stable at
50; and in 2000 there was a slight increase to 56 appli-
cations. Taking into account missing values for some
companies, we were eventually left with around 150
observations. Note that most of the firm show up in
all 3 years; the total number of different firm over the
3 years is 59.
We now give a list of all the variables we will use in
theempiricalanalysis.Thisinformationissummarized
in Fig. 2.
1. The scientiﬁc grade classifie companies into fi e
different groups. Since this classificatio presents
a mere ordering, we do not assign number grades
to the different groups. Instead, we rely on dummy
variables to tell us the numerical distance between
grades.(Thenamesofthedummiesusedinthesub-
sequenteconometricanalysisaregiveninbrackets.)
a. Companies in Group A (companies with re-
search activity and production plants in Spain)
and Group C (with research activity and no pro-
duction plants) are classifie into the following
categories:
• Excellent (SCIENTIFIC DUMMY GRADE
5),
• Very good (SCIENTIFIC DUMMY GRADE
4),
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Fig. 1. Evaluation procedure and determinants of the fina grade.




tivities and production plants, but do no research
(SCIENTIFIC DUMMY GRADE 1).6
2. For the economic criteria, we use all available in-
formation from the application forms. These cor-
respond to the indicators announced in the call for
applications by the Ministry of Science and Tech-
nology. (Again, the names of variables appear in
brackets.)
• The existence of an R&D center in the company
(R&DCENTER=1ifcenterexists;0otherwise).
6 To be precise, firm in Group B are divided into “Positive”
and “Negative” ones. However, none of the firm were classifie as
“Negative”.
• R&D spending as a fraction of sales
(R&D/SALES).
• Outside cooperation (COOPERATION = 1 if
company cooperates with outside firm or in-
stitutions; COOPERATION = 0 if it does
not).
• Patent expenses, in millions of D (PATENT
SPENDING).
• R&D investment, in millions of D (R&D IN-
VESTMENT).
• Total investment, in millions of D (TOTAL IN-
VESTMENT).
• Sales of pharmaceuticals, in millions of D
(SALES PHARMACEUTICALS).
• Sales of raw materials, in millions of D (SALES
RAW MATERIALS).
• Trade balance, in millions of D (TRADE BAL-
ANCE).
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Fig. 2. Firms’ typology.
• Net profits in millions of D (NET ACCOUNT-
ING PROFIT).
3. The scientiﬁc grade and the economic criteria
give rise to a ﬁnal grade. The fina grade or-
ders companies into different categories. To facil-
itate our analysis, we assign corresponding num-
ber grades to these different groups. Since the fi
nal grades should not be viewed as a cardinal rank-
ing, we will use an ordered probit as our estimation
technique.
a. Group A: Companies with research activity and
production plants.
• Excellent (grade 6),
• Very good (grade 5),
• Good (grade 4),
• Acceptable (grade 3).
b. Group B: Companies with development activi-
ties and production plants (grade 2).
c. Group C: Companies with research activity and
no production plants (grade 1).
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In the subsequent econometric analysis the fina
gradewillbethedependentvariable,withtheeconomic
criteria and the scientifi grade as the regressors.
4.2. Ex ante criteria versus ex post implementation
Although the officia call for applications by the
MinistryofScienceandTechnologyspecifie theeval-
uation criteria, it did not reveal the relative importance
of each one of them. To see how the ex post implemen-
tation may have differed from the ex ante announce-
ment, we look at what the data tells us about the actual
evaluation process.
We regress the fina grade on the economic criteria
and the scientifi dummy grades. Since the fina grade
reflect an ordinal – rather than a cardinal – ranking,
we use an ordered probit as our estimation technique.
Indeed, our ranking says that a fina grade of 6 is better
than a fina grade of 5, and that a fina grade of 5 is
better than a fina grade of 4, without implying that the
differencebetween6and5isthesameasthedifference
between 5 and 4. The basic observation is a firm-yea .
Since many of the firm apply in all 3 years of the
Profarma program, we specify that observations are
independent across firms but not necessarily within
firms As already mentioned, in our empirical analysis
we use all quantifiabl criteria announced in the call
for applications. In that sense, we take our theoretical
model as exogenously given.
The results are reported in Table 1. Column (1) re-
gresses the fina grade on all economic criteria and on
the scientifi dummy grades. The number in brackets
givetheP-values.Tofacilitatereading,thecoefficient
inboldarestatisticallysignifican atthe5%level.Apart
from the scientifi grades, four variables fall into that
category: patent spending, R&D investment, the sales
of pharmaceuticals and the trade balance. The coeffi
cients on all of these four variables are positive, imply-
ing that an increase in any one of them has a positive
effect on the fina grade. As can be seen in column (1),
the effect of the scientifi dummy grade is measured
relative to “scientifi dummy grade 3”, which has been
dropped from the regression. Not surprisingly, grades
higher than 3 have a positive effect on the fina grade,
whereas grades lower than 3 have a negative effect.
With a data set of 150 observations, using four
dummy variables for the different scientifi grades is
potentially costly in terms of loss of degrees of free-
dom. To remedy this issue, we reduce the different
dummies to just one variable. Our results in column
(1) suggest that the difference in coefficient between
anytwoadjacentscientifi dummygradesisnotsignif-
icantly different from 1. It therefore seems acceptable
to interpret the ordinal ranking of the fi e scientifi
dummy grades as a cardinal ranking. As can be seen in
column(2),thisapproximationisreasonable.Thevari-
ables which are statistically significan at the 5% level
are the same as those in column (1). The values of their
coefficient change very little. More importantly, the
estimation is more precise, as reflecte by their lower
P-values.
Although we use the call for applications as a guide
for deciding which variables to include as regressors,
there may be good theoretical reasons to think that cer-
tain variables are strongly related. For instance, our
basic regression includes R&D spending as a fraction
of sales, R&D investment and sales of pharmaceuti-
cals. It may be advisable to leave out one of these three
regressors, for instance, R&D spending as a fraction
of sales. This is done in column (3). As can be seen,
the results do not change significantl . Furthermore,
we would also expect total investment, net accounting
profit and sales of pharmaceuticals to be related. This
is confirme by the correlogram in Table 2. In column
(4) we therefore take out net accounting profits and in
column (5) we also drop total investment. Again, there
is no appreciable effect on the results.
Another question of interest is whether the evalua-
tion process changed over the 3 years of the plan. To
explorethispossibility,weintroducetimedummiesfor
1999 and for 2000 in column (6). Neither show up to
be significant We also investigated whether the coef-
ficient of the different independent variables changed
from year to year. This is not the case, so we refrain
from reporting the results here.
Some of the criteria, such as having an R&D cen-
ter or collaborating with outside firm (or institutions)
may show up to be insignifican because the scientifi
grade picks up their effect. To see whether this is the
case, column (7) drops the scientifi grade from the
regression. As can be seen, this does not change the
variables which are statistically significan at the 5%
level.
All these robustness checks leave us with the ex-
ogenously given model (column (2)) as our pre-



















































Determinants of the fina grade (ordered probit)
Dependent variable: fina grade (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
R&D center −0.010 (0.983) 0.074 (0.890) 0.192 (0.734) 0.183 (0.739) 0.130 (0.807) 0.054 (0.925) 0.169 (0.738)
R&D/sales −4.951 (0.222) −3.772 (0.368) −3.805 (0.366) −0.584 (0.902)
Cooperation −0.668 (0.247) −0.606 (0.272) −0.475 (0.337) −0.475 (0.337) -0.465 (0.329) −0.606 (0.278) −0.828 (0.121)
Patent spending 3.189 (0.011) 3.256 (0.011) 3.089 (0.016) 3.088 (0.016) 3.127 (0.015) 3.307 (0.012) 5.111 (0.001)
R&D investment 0.424 (0.033) 0.454 (0.009) 0.397 (0.014) 0.399 (0.016) 0.350 (0.038) 0.464 (0.011) 0.665 (0.018)
Total investment −0.026 (0.334) −0.032 (0.321) −0.027 (0.395) −0.027 (0.393) −0.031 (0.353) −0.023 (0.439)
Sales pharmaceuticals 0.005 (0.022) 0.005 (0.025) 0.006 (0.005) 0.006 (0.012) 0.005 (0.032) 0.005 (0.026) 0.007 (0.003)
Sales raw materials 0.007 (0.230) 0.008 (0.229) 0.008 (0.243) 0.008 (0.237) 0.007 (0.269) 0.008 (0.235) 0.007 (0.477)
Trade balance 0.011 (0.004) 0.010 (0.014) 0.009 (0.022) 0.009 (0.024) 0.008 (0.040) 0.009 (0.013) 0.008 (0.029)
Net accounting profi −0.002 (0.885) −0.001 (0.939) −0.002 (0.887) −0.001 (0.974) 0.003 (0.823)
Scientifi grade 0.745 (0.035) 0.717 (0.042) 0.716 (0.041) 0.713 (0.037) 0.741 (0.039)
Scientifi grade 1 −1.204 (0.030)
Scientifi grade 2 −0.281 (0.465)
Scientifi grade 4 1.170 (0.036)
Scientifi grade 5 2.191 (0.171)
Year 2000 −0.071 (0.681)
Year 1999 −0.028 (0.807)
Pseudo R2 0.2939 0.2841 0.2799 0.2799 0.2774 0.2842 0.1899
P-values given in parentheses. Coefficient in bold are statistically significan at the 5% level.
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interpretation of the results. Given that we are using an
ordered probit, the coefficient in Table 1 do not have
a direct interpretation. For instance, the coefficien of
0.745 on the scientifi grade does not mean that an
increase in the scientifi grade by 1 point leads to an
increase in the fina grade of 0.745. This is because we
are interpreting the fina grade as a mere ordinal rank-
ing, so that an increase in the fina grade of 0.75 does
not have a precise meaning. Instead, with an ordered
probit the relevant question to ask is how the probabil-
ityofgettingonegrade,ratherthananother,changesin
function of the explanatory variables. Table 3 gives us
this information. Consider, for instance, the scientifi
grade variable. An increase in the scientifi grade by 1
point decreases the probability of getting a fina grade
of 1, 2 and 3 by, respectively, 0.13, 0.13 and 0.04; and
increases the probability of getting a fina grade of 4, 5
and 6 by, respectively, 0.05, 0.09 and 0.16.
Tointerprettheotherfourvariableswhicharestatis-
tically significan (patent spending, R&D investment,
salesofpharmaceuticalsandthetradebalance)welook
athowtheprobabilityofgettingahighgrade(above3)
changes when we increase each of these variables by
one standard deviation. For patent spending this raises
theprobabilityofgettingahighgradeby0.13;forR&D
investment the probability goes up by 0.14; for sales of
pharmaceuticals we get a figur of 0.21; and for the
trade balance we fin 0.18.
A firs conclusion from this section is that certain
criteria which were ex ante announced to be important
turned out not to matter ex post: this is the case of, for
instance, having an R&D center and cooperating with




program performs has to do with its implementation,
and not its design. This distinction is not innocuous
because, as we show for the case of Profarma, the im-
plementation may indeed differ significantl from its
design.
A second conclusion is that, in spite of the discrep-
ancybetweenexanteandexpostcriteria,theprogram’s
overall implementation is in line with its objectives.
Our results indicate that R&D investment and patent
spending are important in determining the ranking of
firms This is consistent with a series of papers on the
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Table 3
Effect of evaluation criteria on the probability of getting different fina grades
Final grade
12 3456
R&D center −0.0127 −0.0127 −0.0040 0.0046 0.0087 0.0162
R&D/sales 0.6493 0.6464 0.2059 −0.2336 −0.4436 −0.8244
Cooperation 0.1043 0.1038 0.0331 −0.0375 −0.0713 −0.1324
Patent spending −0.5604 −0.5579 −0.1777 0.2016 0.3829 0.7115
R&D investment −0.0782 −0.0778 −0.0248 0.0281 0.0534 0.0993
Total investment 0.0054 0.0054 0.0017 −0.0020 −0.0037 −0.0069
Sales pharmaceuticals −0.0009 −0.0009 −0.0003 0.0003 0.0006 0.0011
Sales raw materials −0.0014 −0.0014 −0.0004 0.0005 0.0009 0.0017
Trade balance −0.0016 −0.0016 −0.0005 0.0006 0.0011 0.0021
Net accounting profi 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0002
Scientifi grade −0.1282 −0.1276 −0.0407 0.0461 0.0876 0.1628
These results are based on the regression in column 2 of Table 1. The numbers in bold correspond to criteria which are statistically significan at
the 5% level. To interpret this table, consider, for example, the last line. An increase in the scientifi grade by 1 point decreases the probability
of getting a fina grade of 1 by 0.1282, and it increases the probability of getting a fina grade of 6 by 0.1628.
ment and patent counts are good indicators of innova-
tive activity (Pakes, 1985; Griliches et al., 1987; Hall,
2000). Interestingly, the pharmaceutical sector is the
only one for which patents add to the market value of
firm above and beyond R&D investment (Griliches et
al., 1991). The fact that R&D investment and patent
spending are two out of the fi e statistically signifi
cant criteria indicates that the choice of the Spanish
authorities is consistent with what is already known
from the empirical literature. It also shows that they
are not only worried about R&D inputs (such as R&D
spending) but also about R&D outputs (such as patent
spending).Wenowbriefl discusstheotherthreestatis-
ticallysignifican criteria:thescientifi grade,thesales
of pharmaceuticals, and the trade balance. Clearly, the
scientifi grade is closely related to R&D. Using the
sales of pharmaceuticals to determine the ranking of
firm may also make sense if we believe it is a mea-
sure of translating R&D into commercial success. The
trade balance, in contrast, seems to have more to do
with industrial policy than with encouraging R&D.
4.3. Uncovering the premium to Spanish and
European Union ﬁrms
In this section we investigate whether Spanish
(or European Union) companies received favorable
treatment. Over the three years considered, Spanish
firm obtained an average fina grade of 3.75 on a
scale from 1 to 6, compared to 3.65 for European
Union firm and 3.15 for firm from the rest of the
world.
These higher grades could of course simply reflec
better R&D performance by Spanish firms At firs
sight, the data lend support to this explanation. Fig. 3
shows R&D expenditure as a ratio of sales of ethical
drugs (distinguishing between firm from Spain, the
European Union, and the rest of the world). As can be
seen, Spanish firm performed clearly better than the
rest.However,notallR&Dindicatorspointinthesame
direction. For instance, the average scientifi grade for
Spanish firm stood at 2.7, lower than the 3.1 for non-
European Union firms
Regardless of what these indicators tell us, our goal
is to check whether there is any residual preferential
treatment after controlling for all the economic criteria
and the scientifi grade. We therefore regress the fina
grade on the same list of indicators as before, with
the only difference that we now include two dummy
variables to control for the origin of firms The dummy
SPANISH FIRM takes on value 1 if more than 50% of
the firm s capital is Spanish and 0 if not; similarly, the
variable EUROPEAN UNION FIRM takes on value 1
if more than 50% of its capital is from the European
Union and value 0 otherwise.
Table 4 reports the results for our ordered probit
estimation. Column (1) suggests that Spanish and Eu-
ropean Union firm received preferential treatment: af-
ter controlling for all economic criteria and the scien-
tifi grade, the coefficient on the Spanish fir and
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Fig. 3. R&D expenditure/sales of ethical drugs.
the European Union fir dummies are positive and
statistically significant As for the other explanatory
variables, there are two changes compared to our pre-
vious results. First, patent spending ceases to be sig-
nificant Second, the trade balance becomes insignif-
icant in favor of the sales of raw materials. Note that
Table 4
Determinants of the fina grade (ordered probit), controlling for fir origin
Dependent variable: fina grade (1) (2) (3)
R&D center −0.426 (0.18) −0.134 (0.66) 0.108 (0.86)
R&D/sales −3.893 (0.17) −0.158 (0.95) 9.686 (0.23)
Cooperation −0.511 (0.30) −0.692 (0.15) 1.135 (0.17)
Patent spending 1.624 (0.26) 4.804 (0.00) 1.553 (0.51)
R&D investment 0.459 (0.04) 0.748 (0.00) 0.365 (0.30)
Total investment −0.017 (0.49) −0.017 (0.49) −0.050 (0.27)
Sales pharmaceuticals 0.005 (0.02) 0.007 (0.00) 0.004 (0.29)
Sales raw materials 0.018 (0.01) 0.012 (0.05) 0.024 (0.05)
Trade balance 0.006 (0.10) 0.006 (0.05) 0.006 (0.36)
Net accounting profi −0.011 (0.36) −0.002 (0.88) 0.012 (0.58)
Scientifi grade 0.931 (0.00) 3.644 (0.00)
Spanish fir 1.533 (0.00) 0.672 (0.02) −0.417 (0.51)
European union fir 1.132 (0.00) 0.764 (0.01) −0.748 (0.19)
Pseudo R2 0.33 0.21 0.83
Number of observations 149 149 134
P-values given in brackets. Coefficient in bold are statistically significan at the 5% level.
this latter change does not affect our previous conclu-
sions, since trade balance and the sales of raw mate-
rials reflec the same concern of the public adminis-
tration, i.e. the reduction of imports (and possibly do-
mestic job creation). Indeed, firm that produce their
own raw materials (and sell them) tend to be verti-
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cally integrated, and need not rely on imports for their
production.
As before, certain variables could be statistically
insignificant because their effect is picked up by the
scientifi grade. In column (2) we therefore leave out
the scientifi grade, and fin that patent spending and
the trade balance now show up to be significant More-
over, the preferential treatment of Spanish and Euro-




Spanish firm received a scientifi grade of 3.7 on av-
erage, compared to 3.9 for European Union firms and
4.1 for firm from the rest of the world.
To interpret the payoff for being from Spain or the
European Union, we focus on column (1), and calcu-
late what the coefficient imply about the probabilities
of getting a high fina grade. The results are reported
in Table 5. Being Spanish increases the probability of
getting a high fina grade (above 3 on a scale from 1
to 6) by 0.61. In the case of European Union firms the
effectis0.45.Toputthesemagnitudesintoperspective,
the effect of being Spanish is equivalent to an increase
in the scientifi grade by 1.65 points (on a scale from
1 to 5). It is also equivalent to increasing pharmaceu-
tical sales by 3 standard deviations, and raising R&D
investment by more than 4 standard deviations.
Table 5
Effect of evaluation criteria on the probability of getting different fina grades, controlling for fir origin
Final grade
123456
R&D center 0.0734 0.0731 0.0233 −0.0264 −0.0501 −0.0932
R&D/sales 0.6701 0.6671 0.2125 −0.2411 −0.4578 −0.8508
Cooperation 0.0879 0.0875 0.0279 −0.0316 −0.0601 −0.1116
Patent spending −0.2796 −0.2783 −0.0886 0.1006 0.1910 0.3550
R&D investment −0.0789 −0.0786 −0.0250 0.0284 0.0539 0.1002
Total investment 0.0030 0.0030 0.0010 −0.0011 −0.0021 −0.0038
Sales pharmaceuticals −0.0009 −0.0009 −0.0003 0.0003 0.0006 0.0011
Sales raw materials −0.0031 −0.0031 −0.0010 0.0011 0.0021 0.0040
Trade balance −0.0010 −0.0010 −0.0003 0.0003 0.0007 0.0012
Net accounting profi 0.0019 0.0019 0.0006 −0.0007 −0.0013 −0.0024
Scientifi grade −0.1602 −0.1595 −0.0508 0.0576 0.1095 0.2034
Spanish fir −0.2640 −0.2628 −0.0837 0.0950 0.1803 0.3351
European union fir −0.1949 −0.1940 −0.0618 0.0701 0.1332 0.2475
These results are based on the regression in column 1 of Table 4. The numbers in bold correspond to criteria which are statistically significan
at the 5% level. To interpret this table, consider, for example, the second to last line. Being Spanish decreases the probability of getting a fina
grade of 1 by 0.2640, while it increases the probability of getting a fina grade of 6 by 0.3351.
One could of course argue that it makes sense for
the Spanish authorities to encourage research in Spain,
rather than abroad. But this is not the point: data on all
firm inoursamplerefertooperationsinSpain.Inother
words, our information on multinationals is limited to
their activities in Spain. The apparent discrimination is
based on whether the firm s capital is Spanish, not on
whether its operations occur in Spain.
This leaves us with the question: what is the un-
derlying reason for the premium received by Spanish
and European Union firms One possible explanation
is that R&D by Spanish firm is more likely going to
lead to production in Spain. To test this hypothesis,
in column (3) we re-run our standard regression on
the subgroup of firm that have production plants in
Spain. This amounts to leaving out 15 observations.
When doing so, the preferential treatment disappears.
Though striking, this result is not entirely surprising.
Asmentionedbefore,whentheMinistryofScienceand
Technologyassignsthefina grade,firm withR&Dac-
tivities but no production plants get relegated to Group
C, corresponding to the lowest grade.
This implies that firm get heavily penalized for
not having production plants. Since these firm are by
and large from outside the European Union, this shows
up as favorable treatment to local firms This explains
some of our previous findings Whereas Spanish firm
get on average a low scientifi grade of 3.7, compared
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to a higher 4.1 for non-European firms they end up
with a high fina grade of 3.75, compared to a lower
3.15 for non-European firms Such a policy of support-
ing local production is not uncommon. For instance,
Israel, a country in which public support to R&D was
markedly successful, makes subsidies conditional on
future production in the country (Trajtenberg, 2002).
It is less clear how to interpret favoring local pro-
duction. On the one hand, one could argue that part of
the subsidies to R&D should be counted as production
or employment subsidies, and should therefore be an-
alyzed as such (Trajtenberg, 2002). On the other hand,
though, manufacturing may be an integral part of a
firm s scientifi infrastructure in the case of the phar-
maceutical industry (Pisano, 1997).7
5. Concluding remarks
This paper has studied how the Spanish Ministry of
Science and Technology ranked pharmaceutical com-
panies in the framework of Profarma, a government
plan aimed at fostering R&D. Our focus has been on
the implementation, rather than the design of the plan.
By using detailed firm-l vel data, we have shown re-
markable differences between the ex ante and the ex
post criteria. Uncovering differences between design
and implementation, our paper suggests that too much
attention may be given to analyze the optimality of
the design, or to study the achievement of the objec-
tives, and too little to its actual implementation. Even
if selection criteria are optimal, the plan may fail if its
implementation falls short.
In spite of this discrepancy between ex ante an-
nounced and ex post applied criteria, the plan’s imple-
mentation has been shown to be broadly in line with
its objectives. In particular, we found that R&D in-
vestment and patent spending played a central role in
evaluatingfirms FromtheempiricalworkbyGriliches
et al. (1991) we know that these two variables are good
indicatorsforinnovativecapacityinthepharmaceutical
industry.
Moreover, we have shown that the premium for be-
ing Spanish or European can be explained by the large
penaltyplacedonfirm thatdonotproducelocally.This
7 Pisano, op cit., pp. 229–230.
suggeststhatencouragingproductionandemployment,
and not just R&D, may also one of the program’s main
priorities.
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